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Abstract: Recent advances in quantum key distribution (QKD) have given rise to systems that 
operate at transmission periods significantly shorter than the dead times of their component single-
photon detectors. As systems continue to increase in transmission rate, security concerns 
associated with detector dead times can limit the production rate of sifted bits. We present a model 
of high-speed QKD in this limit that identifies an optimum transmission rate for a system with 
given link loss and detector response characteristics. 
 
1.  Introduction 
Recently there has been interest in developing single-photon quantum key distribution (QKD) 
systems that can support one-time-pad encryption at bit rates consistent with broadband 
telecommunications [1-6].  While the range over which secret cryptographic key can be produced 
by a QKD system is bounded by noise and losses in the quantum channel, below this bound it is 
generally true that an increase in the quantum-channel transmission rate results in an increase in 
the secret-key production rate [7].  For a given distance-bandwidth product, it is therefore 
possible to increase the range of continuous one-time-pad encryption services by increasing the 
quantum-channel transmission rate [8].  This approach has motivated the development of QKD 
systems operating at the highest transmission rate supported by better detector timing resolution. 
Improvements in detector timing jitter, particularly in silicon single-photon avalanche 
photodiodes (SPADs), have enabled the demonstration of systems with transmission rates above 
1 gigahertz [9].   
 
Silicon SPADs have a finite recovery time, τ, that is typically of the order of 100 ns.  This 
interval, known as the dead time, is the period after each detection event during which the device 
does not respond to another incident photon.  The dead time occurs after a detection event 
triggers an avalanche in the SPAD.  The amplified avalanche current must be quenched and free 
charge carriers must be removed from the SPAD before it can be reset to its active state.  This 
process limits the maximum count rate of such devices to less than τ-1.  It is worthwhile to note 
that while superconducting single-photon detectors (SSPDs) can support significantly higher 
count rates, they exhibit finite reset times due to kinetic inductance, albeit in the range of 1 ns to 
10 ns [10].  For most QKD systems, dead-time effects are reasonably assumed to have a 
negligible impact on overall performance; typical transmission rates, ρTX, and link losses, L, are 
such that most systems operate in a regime where the detection rate is low with respect to the 
maximum count rate, i.e., ρRX << τ-1.  As the rates of transmission and key production increase 
however, QKD systems will move out of this regime.  In this article we present a model of QKD 
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in the BB84 protocol [11] that describes both the count-rate limitations and the security issues 
that arise as key production rates increase with ρTX.  We find that for given values of L and τ, 
there is a transmission rate that maximizes the sifted-bit rate.  Contrary to naïve intuition, this 
maximum sifted-bit rate can be significantly greater than (2τ) -1.   
 
In section 2, we describe how dead-time effects compromise secure QKD if transmission speeds 
are increased inattentively.  Section 3 describes the secure operation of a high-speed QKD system, 
and presents an analytic model that characterizes the sifted-bit rate in terms of the link parameters.  
Section 4 gives specific results of this model, which are confirmed by Monte Carlo simulations.  
Section 5 describes additional hardware-based solutions to dead-time related issues.  
 
 2.  Problems encountered in the high-speed regime 
The most common detector configuration for QKD in the BB84 protocol is one in which the 
receiver, Bob, has a separate single-photon detector for each bit value in each basis.  We restrict 
our discussion to this configuration and further assume that the detectors are free-running SPADs 
whose low noise allows them to be used without active gating.  This is often the case in free-
space QKD systems and fiber QKD systems with up-conversion detectors [1-6].   
 
In this configuration, when the quantum-channel transmission rate satisfies ρTX > τ-1 photons can 
arrive and be detected at the receiver at a time when one or more of the SPADs is recovering 
from a prior detection event.  If two such detection events occur in the same basis they 
necessarily correspond to opposite bit values and are completely correlated [12].  We address this 
obviously critical operational concern in the next section. For the purpose of demonstrating the 
influence of this effect, let us briefly consider an inappropriate implementation of high-speed 
QKD in which ρTX is increased with complete disregard for the dead time, while L and τ remain 
constant, and measure the correlations induced in the resulting bit string.  Although it seriously 
underestimates the extent to which information is available to an eavesdropper, a common 
statistical measure of correlations in the sifted-bit string is the probability that two adjacent bits in 
the sifted-bit string will have different values.  This transition probability, Ptrans, is 
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where bit[i] is the ith bit in the sifted-bit string, N is the total number of sifted bits and the addition 
is performed modulo 2.  From the description above, as ρTX increases, Ptrans will tend to increase 
from 0.5 for uncorrelated bits.  These dead-time induced correlations are demonstrated in figure 1, 
which shows results from a Monte-Carlo simulation of traditional BB84 QKD without applying 
any techniques to mitigate the effects of the detector dead time.  Clearly Ptrans increases from 0.5 
as the number of transmission periods per dead time, k ≡ τρTX, increases above 1, approaching a 
value of 0.622 for BB84 as configured above.  Increasing the link loss, thereby reducing the count 
rate at the receiver, reduces the value of Ptrans but does not insulate the system from dead-time 
effects. 
 
The asymptotic value of 0.622 is unique to BB84 with four detectors and can be understood from 
the following calculation [15].  At high photon-arrival rates, detection events tend to occur in 
fixed sequences; the detectors recover and then fire again in order.  Without loss of generality, we 
arbitrarily choose one detector to produce the first sifted bit.  After this event there are six 
possible detection sequences, which are listed in table 1.  Consider as an example the detection 
sequence 1-3-4-2, with detectors 1 and 3 representing bit value ‘1’ in their respective bases and 
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detectors 2 and 4 representing ‘0’ in their respective bases.  For this ordering, the probability, P3, 
that the next detection event on detector 3 will produce the next sifted bit is P3 = (½)1.  Similarly, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Bit-value transition probability vs. the number of transmission periods per dead 
time for two values of the link loss.  The sifted bits used here were produced by Monte 
Carlo simulation and clearly demonstrate the onset of dead-time effects at transmission 
rates ρTX > τ −1. 
 
 
Table 1.  Individual transition probabilities for 
each detection sequence.  Boldface indicates a 
detection event that corresponds to a ‘0’ bit value.  
Detection Sequence Transition Probability 
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P4 = (½)2, P2 = (½)3, P1 = (½)4, and so on, are the probabilities that detectors 4, 2 and 1 
respectively will produce the next sifted bit after detector 1 produces the first sifted bit (i.e., all 
detection events in between are not included in the sifted key).  Given the sifted-bit value of ‘1’ 
from the first detection event and the subsequent infinite sequence of the 1-3-4-2 firing order, we 
calculate the probability that next sifted bit is a ‘0’ to be: 
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Repeating this calculation for all six possible sequences gives us the individual transition 
probabilities for each of the six detection sequences, shown in table 1.  Since each sequence is 
equally likely to occur within a long sifted key, we average the resulting transition probabilities to 
obtain 
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3.  Secure high-speed QKD 
Since Eve, the nefarious eavesdropper, has access to the classical channel, she knows when bits 
are detected and in which basis they are sifted.  As discussed above, when sequences of two or 
more detection events occur in a single basis with spacing less than the dead time, the detectors 
within a single basis fire alternately.  This phenomenon provides Eve with nearly all of the 
information about the sifted bit string except for one bit representing which detector fired first 
within a given basis.  Therefore such detection sequences, regardless of their length, can produce 
at most a single sifted bit.  In other words, production of a sifted bit from a detection sequence of 
any length requires that the detection sequence begin when both detectors in a given basis are 
active.  This requirement is necessary for the secure operation of a QKD system at transmission 
rates ρTX > τ-1 and must be imposed on the receiver either by some means of gating the detectors 
or by the sifting algorithm.  We find the software solution to be both more practical and more 
efficient; we discuss active-gating and other hardware-based schemes in section 5. 
 
In the low-count-rate regime the sifted-bit rate increases with the transmission rate.  As the count 
rate at the receiver increases, the likelihood of closely spaced detection events in a single basis 
also increases.  Continued increases in transmission rate eventually result in longer and longer 
detection sequences, each of which can result in at most a single sifted bit.  This effect tends to 
reduce and eventually outweigh the potential improvement in sifted-bit rate gained by increasing 
the transmission rate.  The model we present below shows that, for a given link loss and detector 
dead time, these competing effects create an optimum transmission rate above which further 
increasing the transmission rate results in a decrease in the sifted-bit rate. 
 
We can calculate the probability that both detectors in a given basis are active when a photon is 
detected with the state-space model shown in figure 2.  In this 2-dimensional model, the state of 
one of the receiver’s bases, in this case the H-V basis, is quantified by how many clock periods 
need to pass before each detector in the basis is active, e.g., the state (3, 7) would denote that the 
H detector is three clock cycles away from being alive while the V detector is seven.  Assuming 
that the two detectors have the same dead time, the state space ranges from 0 to k = τρTX, as 
shown.  On each transmission period, or clock cycle, a given detector either moves one period 
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closer to recovery, or, if already active, the detector remains so or undergoes a detection event 
and moves k periods away from recovery.  The probability that both detectors are active is given 
by the probability P0,0 that the basis is in the state (0, 0). 
 
To quantify the probability of having a detection event during a given clock cycle we find it 
useful to define a link loss parameter p ≡ L/8, where L is the probability that a transmission event 
at Alice is detected at Bob (the detectors are assumed identical).  The factor of 8 accounts for 
Bob’s basis choice (1/2), and Alice’s state choice (1/4).  Therefore, ignoring noise, p represents 
the probability that a particular detector produces a sifted bit on a given clock cycle.  The 
probability that a particular detector fires on a given clock cycle is 2p.  As an example, we 
calculate the likelihood of the hypothetical detection sequence shown in figure 2.  This sequence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The state of Bob's H-V detection basis depicting a hypothetical detection 
sequence and associated probabilities.  The size of the space is determined by the value of 
k, in this case chosen to be 8.  Note that, although they are depicted, the diagonal states 
are not accessible in the absence of noise, since they can only result from the 
simultaneous detection of the same photon by both detectors. 
 
starts with a detection event on the “V” detector with probability 2p, moving the basis from the 
origin to the state (0, k).  For the next four clock cycles the “H” detector does not fire with 
probability (1-2p)4, followed by a detection event on the “H” detector with probability 2p.  The 
basis is now in the state (k, 3) and both detectors are inactive.  The state evolves with unity 
probability for three clock cycles until the “V” detector recovers, and then returns to the origin as 
the “V” detector does not fire for the next five clock cycles with likelihood (1-2p)5.  The 
probability of this particular hypothetical detection sequence is therefore (2p)2(1-2p)9.  
 
The state-space picture allows us to calculate the probability P0,0 that a given basis is in the state 
(0, 0) as follows.  We can write the probability that both detectors are active at the (n+1) clock 
cycle as 
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where the first term represents the probability of no detection events occurring and the next two 
terms represent recovery from the (0, 1) and (1, 0) states respectively.  We ignore recovery from 
the state (1, 1) because such diagonal states require simultaneous detection events that will not 
occur in the absence of noise.  In steady state we drop the superscript and note that with random 
signals and identical detectors the steady-state behaviors of the H and V detectors are the same, 
allowing us to write P0,1 = P1,0 = P1.  Thus we find 
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By the same argument one can write the probabilities Pk,0 = P0,k = Pk as 
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which, with substitution for P0,0 from (5), reveals that Pk = P1.  In fact, similar calculations for P1,0, 
P2,0, etc, show that all the states lying upon the axes, of which there are 2k, have the same steady-
state probability P1. 
 
The states not lying on one of the axes represent instances when both detectors are dead.  
Omitting the states along the diagonal, the internal states are only accessible from one of the on-
axis states.  Since the on-axis states are all of equal probability one can show that the internal 
states, of which there are (k2 – k), are also of equal probability, in this case (2p)P1.   
 
The expressions above represent the steady-state probabilities of the basis being in each of the 
states in the entire state space.  We normalize the sum of these probabilities, giving 
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Substituting for P1 from (5) and solving for P0,0 we obtain the steady-state probability that both 
detectors are alive for a given transmission event, as a function of p and k: 
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As stated above, a detection sequence can only produce a sifted bit from events that occur when 
both detectors are alive.  Therefore P0,0(p,k) should be used as an additional factor in the 
calculation of a system’s sifted-bit rate.  P0,0(p,k) is shown in figure 3 as a function of the 
normalized transmission rate k, for three values of the link loss L = 8p.  It can be seen that as the 
transmission rate is increased P0,0(p,k) begins to roll off, approaching zero as k-2 at high count 
rates.  The roll-off of P0,0(p,k) marks the onset of dead-time effects and the departure from the 
low-count-rate regime. 
 
The behavior of P0,0(p,k) in the high-count-rate regime illuminates a characteristic unique to 
operation of QKD systems at transmission rates ρTX > τ -1.  From the standpoint of producing 
sifted bits, when the pair of SPADs in a given basis is considered as a whole, the QKD receiver 
becomes what is known as a paralyzable counter [13-15].  Signals that arrive at a paralyzable 
counter during recovery, though not counted, extend the necessary recovery time [20].  In 
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contrast, non-paralyzable counting systems recover from each counting event regardless of 
signals that arrive during the dead time.  Taken individually, SPADs are non-paralyzable 
detectors; with the exception of twilight counts, when the bias voltage is below the breakdown 
voltage, photons that arrive during the dead time have no significant effect on the detector [16].  
It is worthwhile to note that the response of paralyzable and non-paralyzable systems exhibit 
significant differences only in the regime of high count rates [14], and paralyzability has become 
relevant to QKD systems as researchers seek to increase key-production rates. 
 
Although each closely-spaced detection sequence can produce at most a single sifted bit, it is also 
true that as the length of the detection sequence grows the likelihood that a bit will be sifted from 
the sequence also grows.  In the low-count-rate regime the average length of a detection sequence 
is 1 and the likelihood of sifting a bit from a sequence is 0.5.  For a detection sequence of length 3, 
however, the likelihood that at least one of the detection events occurred in the correct basis is 7/8.  
This fact offsets some of the deleterious dead-time effects and must be included in the calculation 
of the sifted-bit rate. 
 
At any count rate, we can write the probability of sifting a bit from a detection sequence that 
begins when both detectors were active can as 
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where TN(p,k) is the probability that the detection sequence consists of N detection events.  To 
calculate TN(p,k) we can use the state-space model from figure 2.  For a detection sequence of 
length 1 (i.e. a single detection event) there is only one path through the state space.  For longer 
sequences we must sum the possible paths for a given number of detection events.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The likelihood P0,0 that both detectors in a given basis are active when a photon 
arrives vs. the number of transmission periods per dead time, k, for three values of the 
link loss L.  The fact that P0,0 tends to zero at high transmission rates demonstrates the 
paralyzability of the QKD receiver. 
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For example, there are a total of (k-1) ways to arrange two detection events before the basis 
returns to the state (0, 0); only one of these ways is depicted in figure 2.  The probabilities of a 
detection sequence having length up to N = 4 are  
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The truncated geometric series in TN(p,k) can be evaluated with standard techniques to yield 
analytic expressions for all N.  While the sum over N in (9) is theoretically infinite, it is 
worthwhile to note that in practice one needs to compute TN(p,k) only up to N = 6, as the 
probability of sifting a bit from a detection sequence longer than six events approaches unity.   
 
Figure 4. The probabilities TN(p,k) of a detection sequence having N detection events vs. 
the normalized transmission rate k, for link losses L = -20 dB.  There is a characteristic 
difference in even and odd numbers of detection events in the high-count rate regime.  
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One interesting feature of TN(p,k) is the difference between even and odd values of N, as 
illustrated in figure 4.  While all N > 1 sequences have low probability in the low count-rate 
regime, at high count rates the N:odd sequences fall asymptotically to zero, but the N:even 
sequences have constant finite probabilities.  This behavior can be understood from the fact that 
an N:even sequence can minimize the number of clock cycles during which a detector is active 
but does not fire.  For an N:odd sequence, the unlikely situation occurs where a live detector must 
not fire for at least k clock cycles before the basis returns to (0, 0). 
 
Noise sources such as background counts and detector dark counts can also be included in the 
model in a straightforward manner.  We define ε as the probability that a detector experiences a 
noise event during one clock cycle.  The probability that a detector fires during a clock cycle 
therefore changes from (2p) to (2p + ε), which can be substituted into P0,0(p,k) and TN(p,k) 
accordingly.  As mentioned above, a noise event on one detector can occur on the same clock 
cycle as a signal (or noise) event on the other detector.  These simultaneous events put the basis 
in the state (k, k), after which the basis recovers with unity probability along the diagonal back to 
(0, 0).  Thus we find that when noise counts are included, the probability that both detectors are 
alive on the (n+1) clock cycle becomes 
 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) knnnn PpPpPpP !+ +++!++!= 0,0210.010,0  2 212 221 """"  , (14) 
 
where the third term accounts for simultaneous detection events.  The steady state calculation of 
P0,0(p,k) proceeds in the same manner as described above.  It should be noted that while noise can 
cause simultaneous detection events, no secure bits can be sifted from such events.  
 
 
Figure 5. The sifted-bit rate including dead-time effects, showing excellent agreement 
between the model (lines) and the simulation (symbols).  The effect of varying the dead 
time with fixed link loss is shown in (a).  The effect of varying the link loss with fixed 
dead time is shown in (b).   
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4.  The sifted-bit rate in high-speed QKD 
We have described all the factors necessary to incorporate dead-time effects in to the sifted-bit 
production rate.  Returning to the noiseless picture, we write the sifted-bit rate as 
 
( ) ( )kpSkppPSBR TX , ,8 0,0!=  , (15) 
 
where ρTX is the transmission rate, 8p is the link loss, P0,0(p,k) is the probability that both 
detectors are active, given by (8), and S(p,k) is the likelihood of sifting a bit from a detection 
sequence, given by (9).  The sifted-bit rate is shown in figure 5 as a function of the transmission 
rate for various detector dead times (a) and link losses (b).  The lines indicate the results from the 
analytic state-space model presented above.  The symbols indicate results from a BB84 Monte-
Carlo simulation that incorporates the modified sifting algorithm described above – sifting at 
most a single bit from sequences of closely-spaced detection events.  The simulation generated 1 
MB of sifted bits at each point using an ANSI C standard random-number generator running on a 
Linux computing cluster.  As illustrated in figure 5, dead-time effects induce a maximum value 
on the sifted-bit rate, above which further increases in transmission rate reduce the sifted-bit rate.  
The maximum value of the sifted-bit rate is a complicated function of the link parameters.  
However, we find this maximum is not strongly dependant on the link losses.  As demonstrated in 
figure 5(b), it may be accurately approximated as a function of dead time alone by 
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where the constant of proportionality was found by a least-squares fit.  The factor (2τ)-1 represents 
the maximum sifted-bit rate for the case of an actively gated receiver in which all the detectors 
are disabled when any one of them fires [12].  
 
The transmission rate at which the sifted-bit rate is maximized is also a complicated function of 
the dead time and link losses.  However, for typical link losses and detector dead times we find 
that it may be approximated to an accuracy better than 1% by 
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For most QKD links the loss and dead time are such that detector timing resolution plays a 
dominant role in determining the optimum transmission rate [1, 2, 3, 5].  However, as the 
disparity between detector timing resolution and recovery time grows with improved timing 
resolution, transmission-rate limitations imposed by dead-time effects will become more 
significant. 
 
5.  Hardware approaches to addressing dead-time effects 
There are a variety of methods that may be employed to address the security issue that arises in 
the ρTX > τ-1 regime.  The algorithmic solution modeled above is, to our knowledge, the most 
efficient with respect to the production of sifted bits.  An active hold-off scheme has been 
previously proposed, in which all the detectors are disabled when any one of them fires [12].  
Actively disabling the detectors by some electronic means can be technically challenging, 
particularly as transmission rates exceed 1 GHz.  As an alternative we propose the self-disabling 
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receiver shown in figure 6.  In this system the states in each of Bob’s bases are sent to the same 
detector, though with different propagation delays depending on the state. The states of the 
photons incident on each detector are distinguished by their arrival times, much in the same 
manner that time-division-multiplexed (TDM) communications links distinguish various channels. 
With only one detector in each basis, the entire basis is disabled for the duration of the dead time, 
and sequences of closely-spaced detection events are eliminated.  This QKD receiver is a non-
paralyzable counter capable of producing sifted bits at rates up to τ-1 in the high-count-rate regime.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. A BB84 receiver with self-disabling bases.  In this configuration the individual 
states in each measurement basis are distinguished by their arrival times at the SPADs.  
(N)PBSC is a (non) polarizing beam-splitting cube. 
 
As a consequence of operating the receiver bases in the self-disabling format shown in figure 6, 
each transmission event from Alice is analyzed in two time bins at Bob’s receiver.  If these time 
bins are limited by the SPAD’s ability to distinguish photon-arrival times, that is, by the SPAD 
timing resolution, then Alice’s transmission period must be at least twice as long.  Thus the 
maximum transmission rate as determined by the detector timing resolution is reduced by one 
half.  The reduction in transmission rate makes this type of receiver useful only in cases in which 
the algorithmic implementation described above is somehow impractical.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
We have presented a model for the sifted-bit production rate of BB84-type QKD systems 
operating at transmission rates ρTX that are higher than the maximum count rate of the component 
single-photon detectors.  This model addresses critical security concerns that must be considered 
when operating in this regime and quantifies the onset of dead-time effects.  We have established 
that, with free-running SPADs, high-speed QKD systems are paralyzable counting systems.  This 
phenomenon emerges from the collective behavior of the pair of detectors in a given basis, as 
SPADs are non-paralyzable counting systems when considered individually.  We have shown 
with both analytic modeling and Monte-Carlo simulation that dead-time effects cause there to be 
an optimum transmission rate that maximizes the sifted-bit production rate.  The functional 
dependence of the maximum sifted-bit rate on the link parameters has been presented, and these 
relations will be useful in the design of QKD systems and single-photon detection systems.   
 
This article has focused on polarization-encoded BB84 QKD.  A useful extension of the analysis 
presented here would be the application of the state-space model to other protocols and encoding 
schemes.  In particular, the differential-phase-shift encoding scheme used in Ref. [3] readily lends 
itself to extremely high transmission rates.  Detector dead times are likely to have significant 
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influence on the performance of such systems, and the analysis of such influence in the context of 
the current understanding would be useful. 
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